{"href":"https://api.simplecast.com/oembed?url=https%3A%2F%2Frethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com%2Fepisodes%2F4-a-special-focus-on-vertical-mergers-puKhF1ku","width":444,"version":"1.0","type":"rich","title":"#4: Vertical Mergers","thumbnail_width":300,"thumbnail_url":"https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/d078d76f-cd58-4202-9d89-4834cdd60aa8/rethinking-antitrust.jpg","thumbnail_height":300,"provider_url":"https://simplecast.com","provider_name":"Simplecast","html":"<iframe src=\"https://player.simplecast.com/edc7e0a8-547f-4eec-ad5d-491d817f7ca2\" height=\"200\" width=\"100%\" title=\"#4: Vertical Mergers\" frameborder=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\"></iframe>","height":200,"description":"In June 2020, the Trump administration released the first joint FTC-DOJ vertical merger guidelines. These guidelines, which drew heavily on the input of agency staff, were prepared as an outgrowth of the FTC's Competition and Consumer protection hearings initiated by then FTC chairman Joe Simons. While the 2020 VMGs received praise from some, others argued the VMGs failed to articulate certain theories of harm, suggesting a pro-defendant bias. In July of this year, the agencies proposed a revised set of merger guidelines, including theories of non-horizontal competitive harm; the draft was met with considerable skepticism, with many suggesting the draft ignores advances in economic learning over the past four-decades, and that the draft relied on case law without a strong foundation in the economics of vertical integration. Steve Salop and Jeremy Sandford join Bilal Sayyed for a discussion of the guidelines on vertical and non-horizontal theories of harm."}